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Abstract 
The fourth industrial revolution has become a prominent concept and imminent 
technological change a major issue. Facets are everyone’s concern but currently no 
one’s ultimate responsibility (perhaps a little like financial stability before the global 
financial crisis). In this paper, we argue that the future is being shaped now by the way 
the fourth industrial revolution is being positioned.  Whilst no one has set out to argue 
for or defend technological determinism, anxiety combined with passivity and 
complacency are being produced, and this is in the context of a quasi-determinism. The 
contingent quantification of the future with regard to the potential for job displacement 
provides an influential source of authority for this. A background of ‘the future is 
coming, so you better get used to it’ is being disseminated. This favours a capitalism 
that may ‘deny work to the many’ perspective rather than a more fundamental rethink 
that encompasses change that may liberate the many from work. This, in turn, positions 
workers and responsibility for future employment (reducing the urgency of calls for 
wider societal preparation). Public understanding and policy are thus affected and along 
with them the future of work.    
Keywords: Fourth industrial revolution; artificial intelligence; machine learning 
robotics; work; realism; Frey and Osborne; accelerationism. 
Introduction 
Cliché has it that change is the only constant, whilst philosophers and social theorists 
often state that change is poorly conceived. Polanyi, for example, states ‘nowhere has 
liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its understanding of the problem of 
change’ (Polanyi, 1945, p. 41). One major theme of change at the moment is the 
seemingly relentless and widespread imminent impact of new technology. Surveys in 
the United States and United Kingdom consistently report that the public are concerned 
by what seems the rapid rate of change, and that they feel unprepared to fully 
comprehend or cope with it, and this remains the case even where some feel more 
optimistic regarding eventual benefits from new technology (see for example, surveys 
from YouGov and from the PEW Center, Smith, 2018; Anderson, 2017; Pew, 2016).  
One major area of concern focuses on machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
robotics and a variety of other technologies’ impact on work. The combination has been 
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packaged as the concept of a fourth industrial revolution and Googling the term in May 
2019 produced over 39 million hits. The literature is constantly expanding. For 
example, Deloitte’s UK skills (upskills) research series recently reported that between 
2001 and 2016, net employment increased in the United Kingdom by 3 million 
(Deloitte, 2018). However, employment actually fell in 160 of 366 occupations, and 
these occupations did not involve a primary element of human social interactions. The 
inference drawn was that this fits a narrative of eventual displacement of human 
workers by technologies, as technologies and automation spread. Significantly, this 
narrative is quantified. In the following paper, we set out a preliminary exploration of 
how the concept of a fourth industrial revolution is helping to shape the future. We 
argue that it draws on the authority created by quantifying the future and that the form 
and consequences of this are not neutral. The development and use of the concept so 
far has been skewed and has been associated with a ‘capitalism that (may) deny work 
to the many’ perspective, rather than one where ‘the many may be liberated from work’.      
The new (digital) machine age or fourth industrial revolution 
There has been a great deal of debate over recent years regarding globalization, 
technology, organization, work and changes to social and economic life. This has 
resulted in various discourses such as global value chain and global wealth chain 
approaches, as well as specific foci such as the degree to which some jobs have been 
off-shored and how this relates to the way economies have restructured, including how 
wealth is protected and also off-shored (Neilson et al., 2014; Gibbon et al., 2008; 
Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017; Lysandrou et al., 2017). This issue of restructuring, in turn, 
has been embedded in a range of conceptual concerns, such as financialisation, and has 
raised further issues based on post-financial crisis social and political fracture (see 
Baker & Wigan, 2017; Christensen et al., 2016; Van der Zwan, 2014; Hay, 2013; 
Engelen et al., 2012).  
The political economy of austerity, the ramifications of Brexit and of the 
tensions inherent in the election of Donald Trump as one expression of populist 
discontent provide the contemporary context in which increasing significance has been 
attached to the quality of employment, low wage growth, and job insecurity (for 
example, Morgan & Patomäki, 2018; Lavery, 2018; Fullbrook & Morgan, 2017; 
Jessop, 2017; Montgomerie, 2019). Amongst other things, strategic and partial 
‘deglobalisation’ and ‘reshoring’ to increase domestic production has now become a 
policy issue. This is often phrased in terms of improving domestic infrastructure and 
skills to encourage international competitive advantage, able to attract investment, and 
thus the location of multinational enterprises (contrast the global race inherent in the 
current UK Conservative Industrial Strategy, DBEIS, 2017, with Labour’s Manifesto, 
2017; Morgan, 2019a).1 Not only does this market conforming logic sit uneasily with 
incipient economic nationalism, it also invokes technical analysis regarding the 
feasibility and practicality of reshoring as a means to offer more employment that is 
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‘decent’, better skilled, higher wage  and secure (e.g. Collard-Wexler & De Loecker, 
2015).2
However, though not reducible to merely employment issues, a further and 
intersecting context for the future of work, heavily focused on new technology, has also 
arisen in the early twenty-first century, invoking claims regarding a new phase in 
capitalism. That is, what has been variously referred to as a new (digital) machine age, 
industry 4.0 or a fourth industrial revolution (hereafter we will simply refer to these as 
the fourth industrial revolution). This literature grew out of and still draws on the work 
of prominent scientists and futurists (most recently, Tegmark, 2017; Harari, 2017). This 
fourth industrial revolution has its crossovers (Ford, 2015; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014). However, it has been dominated by consultancies, think tanks and modellers, 
mainly drawn from economics or working with economists. The World Economic 
Forum (WEF) under Klaus Schwab and the Global Institute arm of McKinsey under 
James Manyika, as well as the Boston Consulting Group, PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
Deloitte have been particularly prominent in shaping the concept of a fourth industrial 
revolution (Schwab, 2016; WEF, 2016, 2015; Bughin et al., 2018; Manyika et al., 
2017a, 2017b; Deloitte, 2018; Hawksworth et al., 2018). In 2017, for example, Janna 
Anderson at PEW referred to the work emerging from WEF as ‘the lynchpin of 
discussions’ (Anderson, 2017). 
Common to the various terms for the fourth industrial revolution is a focus on 
a number of technological changes. These include recent and expected advances in 
machine learning (ML), natural language coding, Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, 
sensors, connectivity, cloud computing, nano-technology, 3-D printing and the Internet 
of Things (IoT). As we shall argue, a major strand of this work involves basic problems 
that bring into question the claims and contribution of that work to public understanding 
and policy and this, in turn, is not without consequence. We begin, however, by 
providing some sense of the identified potentials of the relevant technologies. This is 
synthesized from the main literature, supplemented by reference to developments and 
projections from some of the main corporations and industry groups working in the 
area. Given the wealth of material this can only be indicative rather than 
comprehensive. For proponents, it involves an imagined near future pulled into the 
present based on trends in technology.    
ML is a set of coding systems and AI is a categorisation of the capacity of a 
technology as an entity.3 So, for example, in the imagined fourth industrial revolution 
factory of the near future, ML is able to make use of large datasets (in real time and 
drawing on cloud resources) to iteratively feed environmentally responsive updatable 
AI. This enables a system where the AI, in turn, is applied to newly lightweight, mobile 
and sensor imbued robotics to create networked management or control for heavily 
automated production. This system is conceived as reconfigurable within a factory 
setting, mobile as a whole factory form and potentially cost-effective at small scale.4 
The much reduced role of humans within this set-up includes working collaboratively 
with ‘co-bots’ and perhaps under the direction of AI whose programming encompasses 
‘responsibility’ for task allocation, logistical timing and supply chains. The concept of 
a supply chain, meanwhile, extends to where natural language proficient Chatbot 
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technologies following the format of Siri or Alexa act as household managers and 
facilitate consumption through coordination functions, which draw the just-in-time 
practices of contemporary warehousing into the home via an integrated (IoT alerted) 
delivery system of autonomous vehicles.     
As the increasing integration of technologies into the home indicates, the idea 
of a fourth industrial revolution is not just production-focused but also diffusely 
service-providing within what is implicitly conceived as a whole life system. And this 
readily extends to a whole life-maintenance system, a cradle to grave network. Consider 
how the health service of the near future could draw on household management AI 
through a health monitoring function to seamlessly integrate this monitoring into 
personal calendar-matched (and so not missed) doctor and hospital appointments. This, 
in turn, could build forward from ML augmented AI diagnostics using recognition 
software and then follow through with treatments that extend from subtle dietary 
modifications, implemented seamlessly through changes to grocery orders, all the way 
to state-of-the-art surgical intervention. Here, the envisaged operating theatre of the 
near future combines remote expert participation via virtual reality, with augmented 
reality body scan overlays, and use of console operated surgical robotics capable of 
precision and steadiness that a human could not replicate (and where the task could be 
replacement of tailored 3-D printed bio-genetic parts).   
Clearly, based on combinations of the technologies, one could provide 
illustrations that proliferate to cover virtually any activity within society. Furthermore, 
it is core to fourth industrial revolution material that it is the confluence of technologies 
that is considered socially significant. The timeline that has emerged for the 
technologies typically (but not exclusively) focuses around 2030, and if we draw on the 
concept of a Kondratieff wave, it is in combination that the technologies create the 
potential for the entirety of economies and society to restructure. So, the changes 
collectively represent an anticipated fundamental transformation. However, this 
anticipation by the main proponents is in so far as individually all of the technology is 
either available in initial form or is something particular groups are working on 
somewhere in the world and that they expect to develop via existing projects and 
research programs.5 The media is constantly picking up on this and reporting novel 
breakthroughs and projects in robotics, ML, AI etc. (adaptive door opening robotic 
units that relentlessly overcome obstacles, tensile trousers that aid walking, 
exoskeletons that augment lifting and carrying, Smartphone online medical services 
etc.).6  
Importantly, there is an additional step implicit in the fourth industrial 
revolution concept because of its emphasis on collective potential. Common to each 
example is the central role of information. The idea of a fourth industrial revolution and 
the individual technologies merely in aggregate are slightly different, since the 
functionality of the technologies and their combinations is implicitly dependent on and 
operative through the collection, transmission and use of information. It is this that 
underpins potential, and this includes at least one other anticipated fundamental 
potential transformation, the potential to measure and track resource use to facilitate 
reductions in use, effective re-use and possible balancing within a circular or 
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‘regenerative’ economy. Survivable capitalism is a final framing that fourth industrial 
revolution material has oriented on.7  
Setting the scene for the future of work and is this time different? 
Now, when merely set out without challenge or analysis the potentials we have briefly 
identified, and the many others that we could, can readily convey the impression that 
the technologies intrinsically lead to benefits (in so far as they ostensibly enhance some 
undefined concept of efficiency, deliver convenience, and facilitate the satisfaction of 
desires and the achievement of personal and societal goods, such as health and 
sustainability). At the same time, underpinning any Panglossian-posed sense of 
potential is an implicit perfection required for this seamless functioning, and this invites 
scepticism.   
Our intent, however, is not to foster some Star Trek strawman that can be 
contrasted with Black Mirroresque critique, but rather to make the point that there are 
different positions and possibilities regarding the role of the technologies. As any 
sociologist, social theorist or philosopher with an interest in the subject might argue, 
and as a moments reflection reminds us, technology is a constituent of a constructed 
social reality rather than something that is developed in isolation from it (e.g. Lawson, 
2017; Faulkner et al., 2010). Since at least Manuel Castell’s work, most have been 
aware that information is not some ideally aggregated, freely available, inviolable and 
homogeneous digital unit (and the recent scandal surrounding Cambridge Analytica 
and the many and various counter-movements regarding the power of Google etc 
merely confirm this). Concomitantly, how technology develops is not a matter of strict 
determinism. Nor is any technology perfect (accidental failure and error will apply), 
invulnerable (malicious intervention is an ever-present threat) or free of the potential 
for manipulation (to have real consequence something – a disseminated claim or story 
- does not have to be true, merely causally efficacious or influential through belief based
activity).8 Furthermore, the development of technology is subject to the values and
principles and mechanisms of societies. And it is limited by the very nature of material
reality (as any ecologist will counter if offered a technological means to persist with
unsustainable growth trends in the name of ‘sustainable development’).
So, what occurs in terms of any confluence of technologies will be contingent 
and varying. Notably, investment must actually occur in time and in places and issues 
of ownership will typically apply.9 Similarly, institutions, rules, laws, behavioural 
responses, rights and obligations will all make a difference to the significance of 
technology, how that technology changes and how we are socialised to use and refuse 
it. We live in a broadly capitalist system of many states, supra-national entities, 
organizational and governance forms. This is anything but seamless.   
There is thus an issue of realising the future and what form that future reality 
will really take. Futurists have adopted more and less positive accounts. 10 The fourth 
industrial revolution too, includes a range of approaches.  As we shall argue, however, 
there are significant commonalities and limits to the range. The important point at this 
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stage is that positions are not irrelevant for how the future becomes the present, since 
they affect how the future will be shaped from the present.  Clearly, this applies also to 
work and the future of work is a major focus of fourth industrial revolution literature. 
If the confluence of new technologies affect any-and-all aspects of society and the 
economy, then they have the potential to affect any-and-all aspects of work. 
Analytically this has fallen into three categories: 1) the displacement of workers by 
combinations of the technology 2) changes to existing types of work, as the 
requirements of work modify to accommodate the new technology (what is termed a 
complementary rather than displacement effect), and 3) the creation of entirely new 
forms of work. A primary focus, however, has been that, since the convergent timeline 
is 2030 for a fundamental restructuring, it is possible that the rate of change of 
technology use in work could be so rapid and the dissemination of technologies so 
pervasive, that displacement dominates (there is more 1 than 2 and 3), creating a near 
future of mass technological unemployment.  
In the literature, whether the possibility is likely has also been situated to a 
contrast with the recent technological past (see any of the main WEF or McKinsey 
sources). Formerly, automation and computerisation had their greatest impact on 
Fordist continuous flow mass production lines and on clerical and secretarial work. 
That is, work that could be reduced to strictly repetitive actions or multiply reproducible 
essentially identical forms – some kinds of work whose primary task base could be 
expressed in simple routines. However, the new technology introduces combinations 
of mobility, monitoring/surveillance, discrimination, multi-functionality, language and 
effectively more complex decision making capacity (which is not to suggest this 
requires an AI be conscious). This greatly extends the range of tasks that could be 
duplicated by technology and thus the types of work or employment that seemingly 
could be affected (Morgan, 2019b):11 
1. Any form of retail employment within a shop space that can be configured as a
smart location that automatically registers the customer’s presence and
consumption activity and combines this with a remote bank charging system on
exit;12
2. Warehouse product storage and retrieval, port and airport container
management employment whose dominant task base depends on ordered and
integrated logistical systems in controllable environments;
3. Commercial driving, delivery and taxi service employment whose dominant
task base is replicable by an autonomous driving or airborne drone unit;
4. Onsite commercial and domestic property construction employment whose
dominant task base can be partially transferred to controllable (potentially
mobile factory) environments in which prefabricated sections can be
manufactured for delivery and assembly, and whose other tasks can be
replicated by on-site mobile automated units (brick laying etc.);
5. Commercial and domestic cleaning services employment whose dominant task
base can be replicated in similar ways to 2 and 3 (pipes, pools, tunnels, tanks,
windows, floors etc.);
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6. Online sales, customer and personal services employment whose dominant task
base is information, direction and advice that an effective integrated natural
language proficient Chatbot could emulate;
7. Insurance, para-legal, accounting and tax employment whose dominant task
base is sorting, collation and categorisation of information according to well
established rule systems;
8. Financial services, including portfolio management whose dominant task base
can be replicated in similar ways to 6 and 7;
9. Medical imaging and diagnostics, safety, inspection and coordination
employment whose dominant task base is vigilance, monitoring, remote testing
and problem/anomaly reporting;
10. Policing and security services whose dominant task base can be replicated in
similar ways to some combination of 3, 6 and 9;
11. Business, journalism and academic copyediting and limited range copywriting
whose dominant task base requires syntactical proficiency, semantic
discrimination and information extraction/summation from depositories and
newsfeeds, reproducible using adaptive versions of technologies developed for
6;
12. Tuition service employment whose dominant task base can be replicated in
similar ways to some combination of 6, 7 and 11.
Clearly, this list covers great swathes of employment in a modern economy. It covers 
many of the areas that have dominated employment growth in financialised, 
consumption driven and service based economies in recent decades: retail, driving and 
delivery, remote support services, and construction. In setting out the potential, there 
has also been a tendency to highlight some “basic” contrasts that can be applied to 
employment choices between humans and the technologies if that choice is a matter of 
possible substitution and hence displacement of humans. In processing and assimilation 
tasks, the greater the volume of material then the greater the speed and accuracy 
advantage ML and AI has over humans. In general, technology does not lose 
concentration, become distracted or go home to sleep. It is always available and will 
work any-and-all shifts. Technology may have terms and conditions based on 
intellectual property, but does not (unless electronic persons acquire these) have 
employment rights. It may involve costs, but is not paid wages. Technology may break 
down or be hacked, but does not get sick or strike, and it may become obsolete, but will 
not need to be replaced piecemeal since it cannot choose to secure alternative 
employment.  
Reduced to this set of contrasts there seems to be a generalised rationale for a 
fourth industrial revolution transformation in instrumental, efficiency-directed, and 
productivity referenced economistic terms. Investment in the technology will 
ultimately pay dividends (in both senses of the term). Of course, this creates a basic 
dilemma that the literature tends to acknowledge but peripheralise or defer. The concept 
of the self-annihilating corporation is antithetical to capitalism. Firms do not choose to 
cease to exist and will individually (and through unofficial cartel behaviour) 
collectively adopt whatever gives them a market retaining or dominating advantage. If 
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firms buy into the idea of a fourth industrial revolution, then they buy into the 
imperative to be early adopters or primary innovators (and states and governments 
similarly buy into the need to foster this). So, there may well be a self-fulfilling dynamic 
to displacement potential. However, widespread unemployment puts at risk the ability 
of humans to fulfil further functions within a capitalist system via wage labour: pay 
taxes and consume to provide aggregate demand, which, in turn, becomes profit, which, 
in turn, maintains the firm.   
Still, within the fourth industrial revolution literature, the momentum of 
argument follows a format focused on providing grounds for adoption of the new 
technologies, in so far as they become available. For example, as Katy George, 
McKinsey senior partner states: 
The problem is not that we’re automating so quickly that we’re going to put 
people out of jobs. The problem is that we need to automate more quickly to get 
the kind of benefits in productivity and in our standard of living that we would 
like to enjoy.13 
There is thus a ‘this time is different’ challenge, and it is, therefore, extremely important 
to be aware of how the future is being shaped through the material that defines and 
dominates the fourth industrial revolution.14 How is the future being presented to us 
now? 
Back to the future 
Clearly, the material set out so far creates the potential for anxiety regarding the future 
of work. Equally, if viewed positively it can convey a sense of time-saved becomes 
time freed. The possibility of technological unemployment is thus mirrored by the 
possibility of working less and doing other things. There is, of course, nothing new 
about recognizing this. Perhaps its most famous articulation, and one referenced as a 
point of departure in almost all the main contemporary literature, is to be found in 
Keynes’ essay ‘Economic possibilities for our grandchildren’, in which he states, “We 
are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard 
the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, 
technological unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means 
of economizing the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses 
for labour” (Keynes, 2009 [1933/1930], p. 360).  
Keynes was writing at a time of economic crisis and yet approached the problem 
based on a fundamental optimism. According to Keynes, capitalism encourages 
technological change and within around 100 years this would solve the ‘economic 
problem’ of meeting material needs. There would, therefore, be no ‘need’ for a full 
working week and 15 hours would be sufficient to ‘satisfy’ a theologically posed 
primordial (‘Adam’) impulse to strive. People would be free to pursue social and 
cultural goods, many of the old principles of society would be shed, and notably, 
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accumulation of wealth for its own sake would no longer be ‘of high social importance’. 
In the meantime, this accumulation (its ‘avarice and usury’) remained necessary to 
drive capitalism to achieve the end of solving the economic problem.  
At root, Keynes highlights but does not resolve a tension based on two different 
framings of ‘need’. The need to interact, work and create as self-expression may be 
intrinsic to what it is to be human, but this is not the same as the need to earn a wage 
income in order to survive within a division of labour that operates according to 
disciplining principles or mechanisms. In this latter sense, labour is compelled and 
profit and accumulation drive the capitalist system. Historically, there is no simple 
relation where greater use of technology and higher productivity have continuously 
reduced hours worked. Over the long term there has been conflict between social and 
political movements that create individual and collective employment rights, terms and 
conditions and the most primitive drive of firms to dominate markets and increase 
profits through exploitation. Critique of zero-hour contracts and also the ambiguous 
work status of ‘employees’ of digital platforms such as Uber merely represent the latest 
version of this. Moreover, in so far as our subject is transformations, there is 
fundamental disjuncture between a socio-economic system premised on wage labour 
and one that becomes other than this.   
So, it is important to note that the world of tomorrow that Keynes is focused on 
in his essay is not ours. That world is not just one that has achieved technological 
wonders, it is one that has implicitly transitioned to a radically different socio-economic 
form of organization. Moreover, Keynes does not specify how this new form will be 
structured or how transition to it will be achieved. The essay, though often referenced, 
thus has little directly to say about current twenty-first century problems of technology, 
except to suggest there are decisions that will have to be made regarding how society 
and the economy are to be organized: there will eventually be a ‘this time is different’ 
issue. Though Keynes was prescient in suggesting this would arise in around 100 years, 
from the present point of view there remains a fundamental and unresolved difference 
between a post-capitalism or capitalism that liberates the many from work and a 
capitalism that denies work to the many.15 It is thus important to consider how the future 
is being presented as also an issue of who will influence the terms on which we decide 
how we live and work (if we work).  
Two of the more interesting recent approaches to the issue of technology, work 
and capitalism are accelerationism and the critical branch of the quantified self-
movement. Following Nick Srnicek’s and Alex Williams’ ‘Accelerate manifesto’ 
(Williams and Srnicek, 2013) and their book Inventing the future (Srnicek and 
Williams, 2015), contemporary accelerationists tend to argue that capitalism has 
become a constraint on the potentials of new technology to facilitate alternatives to 
modernity. From this point of view, the left need not fear and ought to embrace the 
potential in new technology. For the accelerationists, the technologies we have referred 
to previously should be encouraged in so far as they lead to automation, but only in so 
far as this is placed in an institutional context that is a liberation from work.16 So, new 
versions of old ownership forms are encouraged (public, joint, cooperative, commons 
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in the form of peer-to-peer systems etc.), as are reduced working hours and alternatives 
to work via initiatives such as universal basic income.17  
Contemporary accelerationism directly addresses the issue that change is 
conditional on who influences the way the future unfolds. It does, however, sit uneasily 
with an earlier articulation of accelerationism that centered around the Cybernetic 
Cultural Research Unit (CCRU) at Warwick in the second half of the 1990s. At that 
time the argument was more that capitalism itself had been constrained by political 
means and, drawing heavily on a reading of the work of Deleuze and Guattari, what 
was required was an intensification of capitalist processes, since this would disrupt the 
status quo. Nick Land, in particular, argued that transgressive potential was essentially 
uncontrollable and any ‘pretense’ that it could be controlled should be abandoned. This, 
however, involves an implicit normative slide if one is pushing an intent to intensify, 
since advocacy rather than description implies influence. In the case of Land, this began 
as an odd dismissal of what is essentially Polanyi’s double movement, but has become 
in later years the basis of a far-right anti-democratic politics (see Noys, 2014; Beckett, 
2017).18
From the point of view of contemporary left-leaning accelerationism, Land’s 
position is at the very least reckless and irresponsible. From this point of view, if the 
left do not take responsibility and seek to occupy decision making spaces then others 
will. As such, a socialist inspired variant on social democracy has emerged that is not 
anti-technology but nor does it fetishize technology. Srnicek and Williams’ work has 
been taken up by Paul Mason, author of Postcapitalism (2015) and the ideas of all three 
have filtered into the rhetoric and policy prescriptions of both the UK Labour Party and, 
albeit in limited form, the TUC (for example, on the benefits of technology if reduced 
working hours are compensated, see TUC, 2018, pp. 21-30).19    
The left position itself, however, is also not without problems. Pitts, for 
example, argues that Mason and others may be overly optimistic, since more is required 
than reduced labour time for capitalism to become something other than it is, and 
contesting the power of capital requires a deeper grasp of that power (Pitts, 2017).20 
This brings us to the critical branch of the quantified self-movement. Phoebe Moore 
(2018) and others have begun to develop a research program exploring the lacunae in 
current tech-optimist perspectives. One of the current dividing lines is between those 
who see the new technology as taking the ‘robot’ out of contemporary work and those 
who emphasize robots putting workers out of work. Moore draws on international 
political economy and neo-Marxism to reassess contemporary issues of management 
systems (moving on from Braverman’s labour process and other resources). 
Specifically, Moore makes the case that a more adequate sociology of work is 
required to understand the long-term impact of wearables and self-trackable 
technologies (WSTT), once these are widely adopted at work. WSTT are able to track 
movements, tone of voice, conversations, heart rate and many other motions, emotions 
and activities. For Moore, a capitalist context does not guarantee that the long-term 
impacts will be positive. Following a theme we introduced early on in the context of 
fourth industrial revolution potentials, she argues that there are problems with a 
management discourse that emphasizes that more information is better information, 
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which necessarily translates into better outcomes via a mutually referenced well-being 
and performance for ‘well-billing’. People analytics is control of information and this 
has a variety of disciplinary potentials that are subtly operative as power, once one 
places them in context. Artificial standards, psychological harms and alienation may 
emerge, despite any formal systemic expression to the contrary. For example, 
technology, including co-bots, may be introduced as complementary to humans 
working, but what humans will acquiesce to as practices if feeling insecure or 
vulnerable will not necessarily coincide with what they prefer or consider beneficial. 
Whilst ‘affective labour’ (Moore, 2018, p. 93; Clough & Halley, 2007) may involve 
traits and practices that are not readily susceptible to displacement, the prospect and 
fear of unemployment matters, and whilst this fear may not be new it has a new set of 
technological enablers (in a period of ‘precarity’). Similarly, if WSTT makes the whole 
of one’s life a set of data points then who one associates with, what one eats and drinks, 
when one sleeps etc. become points of discrimination and thus possible oppression. 
‘Taking the robot out of work’ may come to be subverted in meaning, and thus ironic, 
irrespective of whether in fact technological unemployment rises (Morgan, 2018a).     
To be clear, however, framings that emphasize transitions that are required for 
liberated labour or that add nuance to our understanding of the power of capital are not 
the dominant way the future of work is being articulated. The main sources of the fourth 
industrial revolution literature have pre-empted this. Moreover, they have done so in a 
systematically skewed fashion.  
Skewed futures? 
We began by stating that the main sources of the literature on a fourth industrial 
revolution are consultancies, think tanks and modellers, mainly drawn from economics 
or working with economists and we noted that that the World Economic Forum under 
Klaus Schwab, Boston Consulting Group, the Global Institute arm of McKinsey under 
James Manyika, Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers have been particularly 
prominent. Most of these are revenue earning entities that operate according to mission 
statements and business models. By their very nature these organizations are public and 
policy facing. They intend to capture attention. In order to do so they define grand 
themes and the fourth industrial revolution is the latest of such themes. Concomitantly, 
economists and fellow travellers are the most policy conscious of social scientists and 
are apt to collaborate and contribute based on their skillset and outlook (a process that 
has only been exacerbated by the new REF’s requirement to demonstrate ‘impact’).21 
Both the organisations and economists offer pathways to the future whose authority 
derives from the capacity to provide conditional quantities for that future; an empirics 
of what ‘will’ happen. Governments, meanwhile, draw on the themes and research to 
inform policy and to add quantities and hence credence to their briefs and reports. There 
is thus a reciprocation and feedback between parties. 
So, for example, following initial McKinsey work and the WEF identification 
of the fourth industrial revolution as a key global theme in 2015 and 2016 the concept 
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filtered into the UK Industrial Strategy Green Paper in January 2017 and developing 
an ML and AI economy were specifically incorporated as ‘grand challenges’ (DBEIS, 
2017). In March 2017, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport published 
its Digital Strategy (DDCMS, 2017) and in October 2017, the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy published the Made Smarter Review 2017 (Maier, 
2017). The commissioned Review was led by 16 senior corporate executives, two 
university vice-chancellors, an entrepreneur in residence and the Director General of 
the CBI.  
The aim of the Review was to assess the scope for fourth industrial revolution 
technologies to affect the UK economy by 2030 and to formulate a set of proposals to 
enable the United Kingdom to become a world leader in harnessing its potentials. This 
was positioned as a response to similar existing initiatives in Germany, China and the 
United States, and was specifically posed as confronting ‘competitive threats’ in a 
global race to adopt and dominate the new technologies. The Review includes a value 
at stake analysis for key industrial sectors and makes the claim, based on a ‘best-case’ 
scenario, that by 2025-2030 the United Kingdom may achieve £7.5 billion in new 
revenue from growth, £10 billion in cost savings, reduced CO2 emissions of 4.5 per 
cent and a net increase in employment of 175,000 (based on 295,000 jobs displaced, 
370,000 jobs created via growth, and a further 100,000 in new kinds of job). 
Significantly, the Review sets out and summarises what it considers key research on the 
future of work: 
Figure 1: 
Source: Maier, 2017, p. 50. 
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A brief glance at the Figure 1 summary indicates that research has resulted in a range 
of claims about employment effects. Moreover, one could extend beyond this range to 
draw on more sceptical positions regarding the history of technology and displacement 
from longstanding researchers (see for example, Autor et al., 1998; Acemoglu & Autor, 
2011; Autor, 2015; Mokyr et al., 2015). However, this is not the most important point. 
The identified range disguises a commonality. The methodology for the Reviews’ own 
commissioned research is set out in appendix four. The appendix states the findings are 
‘reasonable’ on the basis that the commissioned research groups, including Boston 
Consulting, who also did some of the initial research for WEF in addition to publishing 
on their own behalf, produced equivalent findings for other countries. It also notes that 
participants in industry workshops that assessed sectors tended to converge on the same 
problems and potentials. By way of critique, one could, therefore, describe this research 
as collectively self-referencing projection. Methodologically, all this means is that 
sector experts have similar understandings of current technologies and are aware of the 
same sets of mutually referenced disseminated grand themes and research on future 
potentials from the various well-publicized fourth industrial revolution sources. These 
are communicated in ways that reinforce a collective framing. 
For example, WEF’s Deep Shift survey (2015) specifically targeted industry 
experts and was widely reported in trade magazines and in the press. Similarly, the 
consultancies specifically target industry experts, since they are their potential client 
base. Deloitte’s UK skills (upskill) series is explicitly positioned as ‘insight studies’ to 
appeal to UK business and government (whose current trope is ‘contributing to the 
conversation’). Like McKinsey’s output the series serves as a widely publicized 
signaling device to attract clients, rather like market analyst’s reports in finance. To be 
clear, we are not suggesting participants see themselves as sinister, simply that they 
manifestly have influence in a sociology of knowledge sense.   
In any case, as the Figure 1 summary illustrates, a core component in the 
accumulation of influence and authority is the provision of conditional quantities for 
the future. However, common methods cannot make the future certain from the point 
of view of the present, and there is a basic tension in quantifying the future at the same 
time as claiming that fundamental transformations are inherent to the confluence of 
technologies. In this context, common methods essentially offer a spurious (if 
contingently probabilistic) precision as a solution to what is a situation of fundamental 
uncertainty. This cannot be mitigated methodologically by reference to ‘best-case 
scenarios’ (using the Made Smarter Review phrase), and yet this is allowed to pass 
because it offers something to build an ‘evidence based’ report and hence policy 
around. However, this is not neutral, underpinning it is both a set of unrealistic 
modelling techniques and a common shared ideational framework.  
What we want to suggest is that, whilst no one has set out to argue for or defend 
technological determinism, anxiety combined with passivity and complacency are 
being produced, and this is in the context of a quasi-determinism. This takes the form 
of a primary delegation to market processes, resulting in an acquiescence, a ‘the future 
is coming, so you better get used to it’.22 This, essentially remains confined within a 
capitalism that (may) ‘deny work to the many’ perspective (irrespective of how realistic 
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the research that supports this is), and this, in turn, positions workers and responsibility 
for future employment (reducing the urgency of calls for wider societal preparation). 
Public understanding and policy are thus affected and along with them the future of 
work. With a nod to the Maier Review summary above, Frey and Osborne’s influential 
work and the responses to it conveniently illustrate this.  
Impossible futures impacting the present 
In 2013 the economist Carl Frey and the ML coder Michael Osborne, both at Oxford, 
published the working paper, ‘The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to 
computerisation?’. The headline finding of the paper was that in the near future (an 
ambiguous term in the general context of the standard 2030 timeline), 47 per cent of 
total US employment was at high risk (a probability of more than 0.7) of displacement 
by AI and robotics, and 33 per cent at low risk (a probability of less than 0.3), leaving 
an intermediate 19 per cent (Frey & Osborne, 2013, p. 38). Unsurprisingly, these 
headline findings were widely reported in the media and over the subsequent years 
Professor Frey has been interviewed and has commented on the findings many times in 
the press.23 In current academic parlance in the UK, he is particularly impactful. The 
working paper was eventually published in the journal Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change (Frey and Osborne, 2017). According to Google Scholar, as of May 
2019, in combination the papers had been cited 3537 times.24 The key findings, 
meanwhile, are cross-referenced in McKinsey’s work on the fourth industrial 
revolution (e.g. Manyika et al., 2017a, p. 5), Deloitte’s UK skills (2018, p. 25) and in 
the work of Klaus Schwab at WEF, as well as various policy documents such as (as 
noted) The Made Smarter Review. Importantly, much of the response has been either 
to replicate the model or methods or to modify or extend them without fundamentally 
questioning the basic realism of the methods. The quantities may vary but the basis 
does not, though one must be careful to explain what one means by this.   
In 2015, responding to Frey and Osborne, the Bank of England applied the same 
approach to the UK economy and produced equivalent figures of 35 per cent of 
employment at high risk, 28 per cent at medium risk and 37 per cent at low (Haldane, 
2015). Figure 2 expresses this graphically:  
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Figure 2: Distribution of occupational employment in the United Kingdom by 
probability of automation.  
Source: Bank of England/Haldane, 2015, p. 33. 
The method employed by both Frey and Osborne’s original work and the Bank of 
England was to orient on the task structure of work and to look at whether a confluence 
of core fourth industrial revolution technologies could replicate the activity in that task 
structure. The task structures were matched to existing occupations and a group of 
experts at the forefront of AI, robotics etc. were asked whether they expected the 
technology to be able to duplicate the main tasks. If so, then it was assumed that the 
workers in the occupation could be displaced (and the decision was binary – a yes/no). 
The experts were asked to look at an initial 70 occupations drawn from the US 
Department of Labor service dataset (O*NET). Frey and Osborne then developed their 
own algorithm which was run repeatedly on the 70 initial occupations to refine and test 
its ability to reproduce the initial categorisations of the experts. Once refined, the 
algorithm was applied to the remainder of the 702 occupations in order to assign 
probabilities to each (in part based on ‘bottlenecks’). The categorised occupations were 
then run against data from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) looking for 
correlations between displacement probability and wage income (to assess whether 
higher wage, more valued occupations were less likely to be displaced).  
The headline findings of both Frey and Osborne and the Bank of England are 
troubling (47 per cent and 35 per cent of total employment at high risk of displacement). 
They invite anxiety. But what has actually been assumed and achieved? First, Frey and 
Osborne make use of an existing dataset of task structures for occupations. They are, 
therefore, and as they clearly state, focused solely on existing types of work and take 
no account of the creation of new types of work. Furthermore, since the categorisation 
is either/or, there is no incorporation into the quantities of whether and how work may 
be modified rather than displaced.   
Second, it is important to note that the method is built around the convergence 
between expert classifications and a refined algorithm for the assignment of probability. 
When running the algorithm, therefore, what is being tested is the capacity to reproduce 
the expert classifications regarding technology which can via this process be applied to 
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a broader set of occupations. The procedure is thus not a direct evidential test of 
technologies’ effects on occupations as those technologies come into existence. Nor is 
it directly a test of the accuracy of experts in predicting the effect of technology on 
occupations, which is then extrapolated.25 The procedure is not directly constructed 
around realising states of affairs. What the probabilities really mean is thus subtly 
different than what the headline findings might convey to an ordinary reader.  
Third, it is also worth noting that ‘susceptible’ is a highly conditional term. The 
calculated probabilities are of what tasks can be duplicated by technology. However, 
what can be duplicated is a decision made by a set of experts in technology, looking at 
state-of-the-art, and with a view to the near future. It is more reasonably expressed as 
could be duplicated, if expected technological developments occur as anticipated and 
‘bottlenecks’ are overcome. This is not a given, just as, if we return to our second point, 
it would be an error to conflate the accuracy of the algorithm with any confirmation of 
a true state of affairs regarding technology (it is an expression of expertise that assumes 
the adequacy of that expertise).26  
Fourthly and finally, Frey and Osborne are clear that they make no claim 
regarding whether in fact displacement will occur. That is, whether it will be chosen. 
Instead, they focus on categorising what is essentially function (the task) as though the 
form and substance of technology could develop in isolation from society and as though 
how something is used and responded to by people will have no effect on whether work 
is modified or workers are displaced. This requires the assumption that the expert 
decision regarding the potential of technology can be isolated from possible influence 
based on behaviour, institutions and law. However, it is important not to traduce Frey 
and Osborne and those who have followed similar paths. As we noted early on, a 
moments reflection reminds us that technology is a constituent in a constructed social 
reality and there are many different ways in which the reality of technological change 
and its significance could be affected. We by no means wish to give the impression 
Frey and Osborne and others are unaware of or fail to acknowledge this. The point is, 
rather, that the method and model are necessarily separate despite this 
acknowledgement. This raises the question of what role is played by the numbers and 
by the procedure that produces the numbers? 
Arguably, the model and the findings provide a baseline for discussion. 
However, consider again how the numbers are produced: a claim is made that a specific 
percentage of all occupations in a database are in the near future at high “risk” of 
displacement by technology, but simultaneously we are informed that the figures take 
no account of work modification, new jobs created, and the actual socio-economic 
environment for displacement within which the developing technologies will be 
substantively influenced and taken up. The method meanwhile is internally related to 
refinements of tech-expert decisions on classifications. The assumptions, therefore, not 
only lack realism, the numbers can have no real-world analogue now or in the future. 
Even if the future levels of (un)employment for occupations at some point in time 
coincide, all of what is put aside in constructing the model will have been influential in 
producing that outcome and so it would be more reasonable to describe “coincide” as 
coincidence in the ordinary language sense. Future reality will not be confirming the 
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findings based on the method and there is something dubious about the typical way of 
referring to the kind of repeated running of simulations that is inherent to the approach 
as ‘experiment’. No causal powers are isolated and manipulated to explore or test some 
real relation. This is mathematics, it is computation, but is it science and is it social 
science? 
One might, however, suggest that the method and model provide a point of 
departure and that different findings can be produced based on alternative assumptions. 
Arguably, this is progress in knowledge. If we return to the summary of well-known 
findings in the Made Smarter Review the Arntz et al. (2016) OECD research does just 
this. They apply Frey and Osborne’s approach to 21 OECD countries and ‘relax’ the 
assumption that whole occupations are displaced, focusing instead on the displacement 
of tasks. By treating occupations as bundles of tasks, they infer that few occupations 
are fully displaceable and that modification is, therefore, more likely in many cases 
(and this varies by country based on culture-specific content e.g. the value placed on 
the formality of person-to-person relations in Japanese retail). On this basis they 
estimate that only 9 per cent of total employment in the United States is at high risk and 
that the average in the 21 OECD countries, including the UK, is also 9 per cent.   
The relaxed assumptions in Arntz et al. seem intuitively more plausible. 
However, the method is the same and the fundamental assumptions required to apply 
the method remain similarly restrictive in contrast to the openness and contingency of 
the construction of social reality. It does not follow, therefore, that one set of 
probabilities is more liable to be accurate than the other. The actual object of the 
research is in any case a situation of fundamental uncertainty (mutuality for socio-
economic transformative combinations of technology). Neither set of probabilities is a 
guide to the future of work and we would suggest that given all of the points made, the 
numbers as constructs, are literally impossible. They represent a form of spurious (if 
probabilistic) precision. One could just as well refer to this non-pejoratively as elegant 
ignorance as much as progress in knowledge.  
And yet as the web of references and uptake indicates, quantification of the 
future carries weight in various senses. The numbers are part of what constitute 
expertise and thus authority to be considered expert in the field. They induce anxiety 
(or if contested, and new numbers are produced, allay that induced anxiety) but 
otherwise add nothing, and yet they are an empowerment, the practice conveys the right 
to speak and be heard. The discourse also facilitates its own internal focus of models 
responding to models (which uses up intellectual resources and funding). This focus is 
simultaneously externalised to provide the ‘data’ that headlines convey.  
To be clear, we are not suggesting that unrealistically produced numbers mean 
that nothing significant in reality is or will happen regarding technology and work. That 
too would be implausible. The fact that there is a concept of a fourth industrial 
revolution and that some organizations have co-opted the term and pursued research in 
its name or within its confines, does not suggest that potentially radical new inventions 
are also a mere ‘invention’. What we are suggesting is that the numbers start to translate 
highly contingent technological possibilities into a sense of something more definite 
that helps to fix a focus on the fourth industrial revolution and lend authority to 
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proponents of the concept. The work of researchers like Frey and Osborne is one 
important way in which this is facilitated. This is in so far as the numbers start to 
produce a more settled sense of the future. However, ‘settled’ does not mean the ‘same’, 
but rather ‘creates a background’. A background sense that the range of numbers 
produced by different groups focused on the fourth industrial revolution technologies 
defines the range of possibilities for the future, and a background sense that there is 
something given about the eventual intrusion of the technologies into society. Thus, 
there is a sense of ‘the future is coming and you’d better get used to it’. This in turn is 
not neutral and we conclude with this.  
Conclusion 
In a speech to the TUC in 2015, Andy Haldane, chief economist of the Bank of England, 
reported the findings of the Bank’s replication of Frey and Osborne’s work (Haldane, 
2015). The speech indicates he is, with due deference to his audience, acutely aware of 
the anxiety inducing nature of the findings. By contrast, three years later the Bank’s 
Governor, Mark Carney, in a speech titled ‘the future of work’, preferred to place 
greater emphasis on an update of the OECD work (estimating displacement of around 
10 per cent; Carney, 2018, p. 6). Neither Haldane nor Carney are sceptical regarding 
the joint problem of how the range of numbers is produced and both tell similar stories 
based on the main fourth industrial revolution literature (McKinsey, WEF etc.). Each 
uses the numbers as points of reference for the future. More commentaries along the 
same lines will emerge as new studies are undertaken and more data is made available. 
Even as you read this, any online search will probably throw up new headline grabbing 
reports that foreground future quantities for work.27      
In Haldane’s speech, the problem of how to respond to the future was posed as 
one of relax, retrain or redistribute (Haldane, 2015, p. 15). By relax he means choose 
to work less, and though he references Keynes’ ‘Grandchildren’ essay, the implication 
is a neoclassical type trade-off where individuals substitute leisure for work, but based 
on no obvious notion of how the difference is compensated for by a real human with 
bills to pay, and where the would-be worker does not control the context that dictates 
whether there is actually work to choose to do (see Fleetwood, 2016; Spencer, 2009). 
Retrain refers to adaption by workers through education to render their human capital 
less vulnerable to robot capital. Again, the implication is that all those who choose to 
work can be channelled into occupations where work will be available (and this 
includes new types of work). Both these options are firmly and unreflexively rooted in 
a ‘capitalism that denies work to the many’ perspective, though currently, at least, the 
context for this remains one of relatively high employment rates in the United 
Kingdom, despite the many claims that change is imminent.    
Only with the final option, redistribute, does Haldane begin to consider that 
there may be a fundamental issue that cannot be confined within traditional economic 
concepts. Carney, meanwhile, chooses to focus on the problem as one of “transitional” 
frictions that will require new institutions able to facilitate lifetime retraining, combined 
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with a supportive monetary policy (with an eye on the equilibrium rate of interest) to 
facilitate investment (the ultimate result of which will be a more resilient domestic 
economy able to compete internationally, and that no longer suffers from chronic low 
productivity growth).      
Neither Haldane nor Carney are fools, but an open mind is not an empty mind. 
Their responses are conditioned not just by their perspectives as monetary policy 
officials but by their training as economists. In this context, Keynes’ ‘Grandchildren’ 
essay is perhaps less relevant than his comments in the General Theory that it is difficult 
to escape the trap of one’s training in theory and that practical men tend to be “slaves” 
of past economists (Keynes, 1936, pp. viii, 383). The primary response of both Haldane 
and Carney is to view the future of work as a market problem where individual 
responses aggregate to solutions. The concept of an institution is severely limited to a 
market facilitating mechanism and whilst institutions are not irrelevant, responsibility 
is, in the first instance, implicitly delegated to individuals to adapt to whatever the new 
technologies require. This perspective, of course, is not restricted to Haldane and 
Carney, nor is it restricted to technology as something to respond to. Delegating issues 
to the individual that are simultaneously socio-systemic is deep-seated in mainstream 
economics and instantly recognizable as constitutive of the last thirty years of politics.28 
It does little or nothing to reconsider capitalism, despite that the subject matter of the 
new technologies provokes this possibility.      
Pointedly, Haldane was not able to direct his union audience to any government 
initiative or forum that constituted some kind of invitation to public deliberation 
regarding what might turn out to involve profound and basic socio-economic 
transformations. This has changed little since 2015, and one can only hope this does 
not continue. The closest the United Kingdom has come to such deliberation is the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, and its 2018 report 
specifically states that there has been a general failure to create public awareness and 
debate and that this is as much social and ethical as it is economic: ‘The UK must seek 
to actively shape AI’s development and utilization or risk passively acquiescing to its 
many consequences…’ (SCAI, 2018, p. 7). As others have noted, civil society and the 
public have become bystanders or observers. The fourth industrial revolution is slowly 
becoming a major issue – facets of it are everyone’s concern but currently the future 
that may be shaped through new technology is no one’s ultimate responsibility. This 
seems in some ways like the problem of financial stability before the global financial 
crisis. 
Whilst a sense that technology can liberate the worker from work may now be 
on the agenda of left accelerationists at such venues as Labour Party fringe conference 
events (e.g. The World Transformed), the main policy focus remains dominated by a 
more business oriented and conventional set of capitalist concerns with the growth and 
profitability of the firm. From this perspective, the concerns of workers, the sociology 
of work and the broader issues of technology in society, are peripheral or additional. In 
the United Kingdom, the fourth industrial revolution has simply become part of an 
industrial strategy that may help to define its post-Brexit economy. The Made Smarter 
Review, for example, follows a similar reasoning to Carney: the UK lacks and must 
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create a more conducive informational infrastructure to facilitate transition to fourth 
industrial revolution technologies (and there is no alternative to this because it is a 
matter of international competition to attract capital and grow trade). The means to 
facilitate this, however, are the creation of hub technology, skill dissemination centres 
and more training combined with some small-scale funding and loan availability. All 
of which amounts to, once applied to the government’s ‘grand strategy’ approach, ‘you 
do it, we know you can’. This, of course, is not only compatible with decades of policy 
framing, it is also a consequence of an austerity frame of reference where politics is 
dominated by Brexit negotiations, and where austerity based fiscal policy (despite 
declarations to the contrary) still deters government from undertaking more radical 
investment or social experimentation.  
The framing of policy, therefore, is not neutral. It absorbs the fourth industrial 
revolution concept according to market conforming logics that allow government to 
limit its responsibility for shaping the future, even as it continues to herald the potential. 
And this, of course, segues easily into the kinds of concerns and foci that consultancies, 
such as McKinsey, necessarily find most conducive to explore: investment as a 
corporate wealth generating and protecting exercise. To be clear, we by no means wish 
to suggest that a technological future will be dystopian nor that the future of work 
involves worse-case outcomes of rapid catastrophic displacement as simply fate. It is 
rather that public policy is currently not really focused on preventing this latter outcome 
becoming fact. One might go as far as to suggest that a failure of public policy makes 
worse-case outcomes more likely, and so a creeping ‘the future is coming, so you better 
get used to it’ is doing little to proactively shape the future in the interests of the workers 
of tomorrow if there are workers tomorrow (Morgan, 2018b). There is great scope for 
change here in every sense of that word.  
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1 There are various issues to disentangle. For example, globalization theory is 
underpinned by comparative advantage, but the theory takes an implicitly consumer 
point of view, and tends to ignore distributions and real time effects, whilst assuming 
capital is fungible rather than specific, static and destroyed if corporations relocate. As 
ideology, this conflates protectionism with the creation of domestic policy space to 
shape trade, and enhances both the power of MNEs and the scope of financialisation 
(see Fullbrook & Morgan, 2017).   
2 The issues are complex. For example, a focus on bringing factories back needs to 
carefully specify that assembly is a small fraction of the overall production process. 
Apple, for example, uses over 750 contracted entities around the world to produce an 
iPhone and only $8 of the estimated $378 cost of an iPhone X is attributable to final 
assembly. Moreover, this aspect of the process is most easily automated and least likely 
a source of secure high wage employment. Foxconn in China is already heavily 
investing in automation so the gains from any relocation into Europe (the United 
Kingdom) or United States might be small and, if one were to justify this in terms of 
redressing balance of trade issues, this seems more a matter of the failure of standard 
measures of trade to be calculated in terms of the value added in places rather than the 
total valuation of products shipped (the US deficit with China, for example, is likely a 
third lower than the recent figures that have exercised President Trump).     
3  AI discourse learning, intelligence etc. have been appropriated as reasonable terms 
to use regarding what machines/computers/programs do. This, of course, disguises a 
basic difference to the human who has intelligence or can learn - consciousness and 
self-consciousness, which makes the entity not just a system of symbol manipulation 
for functions but a being for whom processes are meaningful. This has created 
significant debate in the philosophy of AI initiated by Turing and Searle (Morgan, 
2018b). ML and AI research has moved on from simple discrete-state input-output 
concepts and approaches, and Bayesian or Boolean solutions. The major innovation 
providing the background in current AI is ‘deep learning’ using artificial neural 
networks (ANN). ANN are described as software simulations of neuron connectivity 
(The Economist, 2016) That is, they are multiply layered sets of ‘neural units’ creating 
multiple dividing points for direction, as processing, from some given input to some 
output. The sophistication of the system or its capacity for difference and range is based 
on the number of layers, the ‘depth’, in the structure. What the system is directed to can 
then (currently) be set up in three ways expressed as learning modes: 1) supervised 
learning (a network system is fed an example dataset that exemplifies what it is intended 
to achieve, such as spam identification) 2) unsupervised learning (a network system is 
fed an example dataset and is set up to look for patterns, clusters, anomalies in the data, 
which then become the specific output within a broader data-defined remit, such as 
fraud patterns in insurance claims) 3) reinforcement learning (a network system is fed 
an example dataset and refines its behaviour based on rewards as feedback to achieve 
goals, creating a simulation of ‘do what works best in situation x’, such as playing and 
winning a video game). In all three cases the key innovation is that the network 
progressively refines the weighting between connections, and it thus fine-tunes the 
network system. The more data the system has to work with, the more layers to the 
neural network and the more simulations run, then the more effective the system 
becomes, over time and in real time, subject to processing capacity and speed.   
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4 For example, the multinational enterprise ABB dominates the production and 
development of industrial robotics (its smallest of 4 divisions is larger in revenue terms 
than the next four largest corporations combined). ABB’s Yumi range next generation 
robot is networked, sensor-fitted, dual-armed, multi-functional, easily reprogrammable, 
only 38kg and cost $40,000 per unit. Software support is also provided for hardware 
systems to allow virtual factory redesigns to improve (essentially Taylorist) production 
systems and to enable anticipation of mechanical problems based on analytics of wear 
and tear etc. The implication is that future factories can be small and flexible and require 
far lower initial investment. All the main corporations are developing similar ranges 
and support services.  
See http://new.abb.com and http://new.abb.com/future ABB is one of the listed 
‘partners’ of WEF’s Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
https://www.weforum.org/centre-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/about   
5  This in turn is reflected in the primary research published across the sciences, which 
intersects with operational research and technocratic organizational modelling problem 
sets, and this is where much of the formal work is currently being done making use of 
the fourth industrial revolution concept (typically as industry 4.0). See recent work in 
the journals: Cybernetics and Systems, International Journal of Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing, and Production Planning and Control. The range of current projects 
and programs is set out most clearly in the World Economic Forum Deep Shift report 
(WEF, 2015). The associated forecasts based on surveys are, however, highly 
contestable. 
6 For example, Boston Dynamics Youtube video is distributed via The Guardian 
newspaper’s site:  
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/video/2018/feb/21/human-robot-dog-
boston-dynamics-door-opening-spotmini   
7 See also the WEF ‘Fourth industrial revolution for the Earth’ series: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/can-technology-save-life-on-earth   
8 This is to say nothing of the inherent dangers of a new phase in dependency: a society 
of division of labour creates a situation where we become mutually dependent and 
begin to lose the skills and capacity to survive in small groups or isolation, an increasing 
use of technologies and then delegation of activity to technological systems exacerbates 
the basic problem of how one survives any significant dysfunction to the system we 
call civilization. This is slightly different than AI singularity and Terminator scenarios. 
9 For example, according to the International Federation of Robotics there are currently 
fewer than 2 million industrial robots in the world and the vast majority are purposed 
for the automotive industry. Current investment trends indicate the growth in use of 
industrial robots is highly variable by industrial sector and geographical region (China 
and East Asia dominate based on production, investment and density). However, the 
eventual impact on jobs is considered to be significant and draws heavily on research 
findings from the main fourth industrial revolution literature. See IFR, 2017a, 2017b. 
10 These range from those focused on the near future of around 2030 to longer range 
futurist projections covering the next 10,000 years (contrast Tegmark, 2017; Harari, 
2017). 
11 Numerous attempts to state the scope of effects in terms of categories have been 
formulated. See, for example, WEF https://www.weforum.org/agenda/archive/fourth-
industrial-revolution/  
and also WEF Digital Transformation Initiative (DTI), initiated 2015: 
http://reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation/    
Note there is also great scope for effects on agribusiness. 
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12 This is just one of the areas where various other technologies may come together: 
smartphones, blockchain, cryptocurrencies and so forth.  
13https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/future-of-organizations-and-work/the-
digital-future-of-work-policy-implications-of-automation    
14 For example, Ford (2015) argues that this time is different because machines have 
ceased to be tools and are now workers and the long rise or virtuous feedback loop 
between productivity, employment and wages has been broken, something partly 
illustrated by the increased inequality in the United States in particular and other 
countries in general in recent years. Disruptive technology is a system wide problem 
requiring careful restructuring in order to enable prosperity to continue for the many. 
15 Amongst other things this creates additional context for recent debate over ‘bullshit 
jobs’. That is, capitalism’s capacity to create meaningless jobs that seem to serve no 
obvious purpose and that the worker knows need not exist (the organization would 
seemingly continue without it). These create new scope for alienation and are an odd 
mirror of the over-employment problem that existed in command economies such as 
China (e.g., the person whose job it was to sit by the door and guard the key). David 
Graeber (2018) initiated the current discourse in an article in Strike in 2013; a UK 
YouGov poll in 2015 found that 35 per cent of employees think their job is meaningless 
and 33 per cent experience no personal satisfaction in doing it. In any case, there is a 
normative issue of social value related to CEOs, investment bankers etc. despite that 
they may be at low risk of displacement. 
16 Note, though the movement is still generically referred to as accelerationism Srnicek 
and Williams have dropped the term as potentially misleading, since the aim is to 
transform and in some ways slow human existence against the trends inherent in 
modernity.   
17 The issue of ownership, in turn, raises longstanding issues regarding the nature of 
property and how these might also develop in a post-capitalist context (see Ireland & 
Meng, 2017).   
18 Land’s early work is expressed in the postmodern idiom that had captured much of 
radical thought at that time. It is characterized by impenetrable self-referential verbiage, 
where no idea is completed or justified according to prevailing standards of reason and 
evidence (these are enemies), and whilst assertions abound, nothing is clearly explained 
in a way a reader might interpret as an attempt to be understood, nothing is definitively 
stated because nothing can be defined; one merely allows a stream of neologisms to 
accumulate and calls this an intervention. For example, ‘Since the history of 
thermodynamics is the history of technicizing commerce – of modernizing machines – 
any account that autonomizes science inevitably moralizes social change (into political 
theatre)’ (Land, 1995, p. 133). Land’s writing works as a kind of provocation, sentence 
by sentence and in a literary sense. He has an excellent turn of phrase, but from the 
point of view of everything his style rejects, it is pretentious bombast.   
19 Later we argue that the fourth industrial revolution material has pre-empted debate 
by its capacity to quantify the future. This bleeds into the material published by and 
limited arguments of organizations like the TUC since they tend to rely on the data 
produced by the various sources associated with the fourth industrial revolution. They 
use these to position the significance of the issue, despite that, as we shall argue, the 
numbers are dubious.   
20 More prosaically, universal basic income (UBI) has its critics (see Fleetwood, 2014). 
UBI raises issues regarding the role of the state as a provider of services in relation to 
how basic income is provided, what it is spent on, and what it is intended to replace 
28 
(there is a neoliberal variant of basic income where the state is hollowed out in favour 
of further privatisation).  
21 For a specific argument at McKinsey regarding the scope for prediction offered in 
the context of AI see: 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/the-
economics-of-artificial-intelligence  
22Note, one must be careful not to misrepresent WEF and other contributors. The issue 
is emphasis and framing rather than lack of acknowledgement that many issues and 




23 For example, in December 2015 Professor Frey was interviewed by Raconteur for 
the headline piece in their Future of Work supplement provided with The Times. For an 
archive of Professor Frey’s media activity see: 
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/people/453    
24 Autor (2015), for example, is the main contrasting paper and that had 1026 citations, 
whilst the OECD paper Arntz et al. (2016) had 702 (see later).   
25 In any case, this would likely replace one problem of atomism, regularity and closure 
with another (see Fleetwood, 2017). Autor, for example, favours production functions 
and more standard econometric analysis. 
26 The use of the term ‘risk’ for the probability is perhaps intended to account for the 
issue of the ‘given’, but presupposes the efficacy of deriving a numeric probability for 
a conditional possibility (an issue ultimately of whether any kind of relevant 
distribution can reasonably be assumed to exist and can in some way be estimated or 
derived). Philosophy of mathematics and of analytical statistics have produced a great 
deal of critique of the problem.  
27 The Hawksworth et al. (2018), for example, repackage the transformative effects of 
a fourth industrial revolution into 3 successive (but partially overlapping) waves: 1. 
Algorithmic (affecting data driven-processing employment sectors in the early 2020s); 
2. Augmentation (affecting robotics, warehousing and also more complex decision
making tasks for data by the late 2020s); 3. Autonomous (extending to transport and
construction, but building on 1 and 2 to affect all sectors to some degree by mid-2030s).
They apply this to the same OECD dataset as other research and forecast gendered and
education based displacement possibilities for current employment ranging from
around 5 per cent initially to up to around 45 per cent in the mid-2030s for those with
low education (affecting men more than women).
28 Workers of course are socialized by this. For example, the PEW Research Center’s
The State of American Jobs survey based on a sample of 5006 people in 2016 found
that 54 per cent of participants felt that retraining was essential to maintaining their
employability and 72 per cent responded that it was the individual’s responsibility to
seek out training.
